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Abstract 
 
Theories of fragmentation and constitutionalisation have long been presented as antagonistic accounts 
of the global legal order. Fragmentation theorists posit a non-hierarchical order explained in terms of 
the relationships between general and specialised areas of international law. Constitutionalisation’s 
adherents, by contrast, identify the global legal order’s ongoing transformation from horizontal and 
consent-based roots towards a hierarchal structure grounded upon fundamental principles. The 
proliferation of international tribunals has long been recognised as a factor muddying the picture of 
constitutionalisation and pointing towards fragmentation within international law. We argue, however, 
that this proliferation enhances the global order’s potential for constitutionalisation. The current state 
of fragmentation within the uncodified global order is comparable to long periods when the UK’s 
uncodified constitution exhibited the hallmarks of fragmented development. We bridge these 
supposedly rival explanations for the development of legal orders by re-evaluating the role played by 
competing courts in the UK’s constitutionalisation process, reassessing developments familiar to 
common-law historians through the prism of fragmentation theory. The UK example indicates that 
fragmentation is not, of itself, an insurmountable obstacle to constitutionalisation within the global 
order and may even mark a stage within this process. We employ lessons derived from this comparison 
to evaluate current flashpoints in relations between international tribunals, including the European 
Court of Justice’s Opinion 2/13 which has for now stymied the European Union’s efforts to accede to 
the European Convention on Human Rights. 
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Introduction 
 
Courts are bellwethers of their legal orders. Their very establishment is indicative of legalisation, while 
their proliferation suggests that constituent and constituted power holders within a system accept 
adjudication as ‘as a viable and effective option for the resolution of disputes between them’.1 One of 
the most striking features of the ‘new world order’ of the 1990s was the creation of new international 
and regional tribunals in response to dissatisfaction with an international system hitherto largely 
structured around the interests of the sovereign state.2 Courts with mandatory jurisdictions increasingly 
displaced ad hoc consensual forms of dispute settlement. Within constitutionalised governance orders, 
new courts would ordinarily be woven into a hierarchical structure. In new states constitutional drafters 
can draw upon multiple comparators in structuring such a hierarchy of courts. The latest generation of 
international and regional courts, however, have been created to address the immediate needs of 
particular policy areas or at the behest of particular actors, and not under the aegis of a coherent 
overarching model of global governance.  
 Other actors have largely left international tribunals to develop their relationships with each 
other, leading to competing accounts which attempt to place such interactions within the context of 
broader changes to the global legal order. In this article we focus upon the rival visions of 
constitutionalisation, which contends that the global legal order is deepening under the influence of 
nascent constitutional principles, and fragmentation, by which the global legal order’s increasing 
complexity is identified as a potential threat to its coherence. We challenge this dichotomy, 
reconceptualising fragmentation and constitutionalisation as processes which are intertwined within 
ongoing developments in global governance. Our analysis rests upon two propositions. First, the 
proliferation of international tribunals is currently one of the most important phenomena within the 
global legal order.3 In the last 50 years the ranks of international tribunals have swelled from a handful 
to over 100 active bodies.4 Second, although this multiplication of tribunals is often treated as having 
as deleterious impact upon the global legal order, the reality is that fragmentation is a common and 
formative experience within developing governance orders. We draw upon the Marxist-Hegelian 
concept of ‘conflicting forces leading to transformation rather than impasse’,5 to argue that messy 
                                                 
1 T. Buergenthal, ‘Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals: Is It Good or Bad?’ (2001) 14 Leiden JIL 267, 272. 
2 See K.J. Alter, The New Terrain of International Law: Courts, Politics, Rights (PUP, 2014) 154-158. 
3 See E. Benvenisti and G.W. Downs, ‘The Empire’s New Clothes: Political Economy and the Fragmentation of 
International Law’ (2007-2008) 60 Stanford LR 595, 596. 
4 See W. Burke-White, ‘International Legal Pluralism’ (2004) 25 Michigan JIL 963, 965. The Project on International 
Courts and Tribunals provides a useful guide to these institutions, available at: http://www.pict-
pcti.org/publications/synoptic_chart/synop_c4.pdf. Accessed 1 Sep 2016. 
5 T. Sowell, ‘Marxian Value Reconsidered’ (1963) 30 Economica 297, 308. 
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exchanges between tribunals can contribute to the development of constitutional attributes within a 
fragmented legal order. Initial interactions between international tribunals with overlapping 
jurisdictions will almost inevitably be fractious, but what Hegel characterised as a process of 
recognition can curtail these conflicts and enrich the global legal order.6 This article examines the 
extent to which such a process of recognition is underway between international tribunals and whether 
this process contributes not simply to a thicker body of global law, but to the constitutionalisation of 
the global legal order.  
 To shed new light on the expanding role of courts within the global legal order we draw 
comparisons with the development of courts within a constitutionalising domestic order. For this 
purpose the constitutional history, from the middle ages to the nineteenth century, of the polity which 
in 1707 became the United Kingdom (UK) provides a suitable frame of reference, being marked by 
‘multiple … courts with overlapping jurisdictions compet[ing] over many of the issues that now 
comprise the common law’.7 This history showcases courts’ efforts within a fragmented legal order to 
preserve their jurisdictions against encroachments by rival tribunals. In the absence of any formal 
programme of constitutionalisation these clashes demarked jurisdictions, developed working 
relationships between courts and even elucidated constitutional principles which would become 
fundamental to the UK’s governance order. In short, the activity of these competing courts had a 
constitutionalising effect. Today, a similar process of unstructured constitutionalisation is arguably 
being sustained through the interactions of international tribunals. Although the UK’s experience of 
gradual domestic constitutionalisation is not unique, its uncodified constitution has kept on display 
some of the markers of the historic constitutionalisation process, which are concealed in other domestic 
orders. The very fact that the UK’s Constitution and the burgeoning global constitutional order are 
both uncodified facilitates comparison between the historic process within the UK and current global 
developments.  
 We are not, in this article, advocating the transposition of any substantive UK governance 
arrangements to the global legal order. UK constitutional history instead provides us with an example 
of the operation over centuries of both fragmentation and constitutionalisation within a domestic legal 
order. This history acts as a proxy by which we can explain important features of judicial interaction 
within the fragmented and still early-stage process of global constitutionalisation. The gradual 
integration of the UK’s court structures did not take place in a vacuum, with political, cultural and 
economic factors all contributing to a process which cannot be simplified as a linear movement from 
                                                 
6 See G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit (A.V. Miller, trans., OUP, 1977) 112. 
7 E.P. Stringham and T.J. Zywicki, ‘Rivalry and Superior Dispatch: An Analysis of Competing Courts in Medieval and 
Early Modern England’ (2011) 147 Public Choice 497, 498. 
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arbitrary justice administered by a ramshackle collection of tribunals to a cohesive system of courts 
imbued with the principle of the rule of law. But, as events like Brexit attest, the path of global 
constitutionalisation is neither direct nor certain to achieve a constitutionalised end. The backlash 
against the International Criminal Court in Africa, moreover, demonstrates that the proliferation of 
such courts does not necessarily and of itself enhance justice or fairness within the global order. In this 
article’s final section we apply the insights we have drawn from UK constitutional history in reflecting 
upon prominent clashes between international tribunals, including the disputed nature of the control 
test for state responsibility, the forum shopping within international environmental law and the 
opposition of the European Court of Justice (CJEU) to European Union (EU) accession to the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
 
Theoretical and Methodological Considerations 
 
Before we proceed to our substantive account of the interaction between fragmentation and 
constitutionalisation we must explain its theoretical and methodological foundations. In this section 
we first outline the relevant elements of global constitutionalisation and fragmentation theories and 
develop our understanding of their inter-relationship before moving to the historical account of Courts 
in the UK. Thereafter we explain how we can draw defensible conclusions from an analysis which 
spans the international, regional and domestic levels of governance given the distinct nature of these 
levels of governance.  
 
(i) Constitutionalisation and Fragmentation  
 
No single conceptual framework captures the complexity of contemporary global governance.8 
Constitutionalisation and fragmentation theories, however, are often presented as conflicting accounts 
of the global legal order’s development. Constitutionalisation theorists argue that the global legal order 
is undergoing a shift from a horizontal and consent-based system to a structured order embodying core 
constitutional norms.9 Whilst Neil Walker maintains that the term constitutional usually connotes ‘a 
                                                 
8 See D. Kennedy, ‘The Mystery of Global Governance’ (2008) 34 Ohio NULR 827, 844. Pluralist or global administrative 
law approaches are beyond the scope of our article; see N. Krisch and B. Kingsbury, ‘Introduction: Global Governance 
and Global Administrative Law in the International Legal Order’ (2006) 17 EJIL 1, A. Fischer-Lescano and G. Teubner, 
‘The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism’ (1991-1992) 13 Cardozo LR 1443. 
9 See B. Fassbender, ‘The United Nations Charter as Constitution of the International Community’ (1998) 36 Columbia 
JTL 529, 529 and J. Klabbers, ‘Setting the Scene’ in J. Klabbers, A. Peters and G. Ulfstein, The Constitutionalisation of 
International Law (OUP, 2009) 1, 10.  
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mature rule-based or legal order’,10 this school of thought fractures when it comes to enunciating the 
features of constitutionalised global governance. There are as many different visions of a global 
constitution, and the explanations of the current degree of progress towards its achievement, as there 
are global constitutionalisation theorists. Constitutionalisation’s adherents differ in their accounts of a 
‘post-Westphalia world’11 precisely because the global legal order’s structure and its underlying 
principles are still ‘emerging’.12 Fragmentation theory, by contrast, focuses upon the relationships 
between general international law and the ever expanding number of specialised areas under its 
superstructure. Whereas some areas, including international humanitarian law, are the product of long 
history others, including environmental law, are developing rapidly from more recent beginnings. Each 
new area of governance brings with it the potential for overlap and conflict with general international 
law and better-established sectoral jurisdictions. As a result the global order sags under the weight of 
‘conflicting and multiplying jurisdictions, asserting the validity or persuasiveness of their rules, with 
no decider of last resort’.13 The increasing number of international regimes and growing complexity 
of their inter-relationships is considered antagonistic to the development of overarching constitutional 
principles. 
We contend that the factionalism inspired by these accounts of global governance obscures the 
possibility of combining them into an overarching narrative that potentially directly contributes to 
substantive constitutionalism beyond the state. Even modest accounts of constitutionalisation have 
been criticised for attempting to wish a constitutional order into existence in the absence of ‘a definitive 
framework of implementation’.14 Such critiques, derived from fragmentation-based accounts, identify 
a constitutionalised global legal order as unrealised and misdiagnose it as being unrealisable without 
a codified instrument. We offer no such model for constitutionalisation. Instead, we demonstrate how 
the proliferation of international courts and the competition between them, even if varying in intensity 
within the global legal order, is contributing to a shift away from a legal order characterised by 
governmental consent. Our approach presupposes no features of the constitutionalisation process 
beyond courts acting in an “autonomous” manner, meaning that their adjudication cannot be explained 
                                                 
10 N. Walker, ‘Taking Constitutionalism beyond the State’ (2008) 56 Political Studies 519, 526.  
11 N. Walker, ‘Post National Constitutionalism and the Problem of Translation’ in J.H. Weiler and M. Wind (eds.), 
European Constitutionalism beyond the State (CUP, 2003) 53. 
12 E. de Wet, ‘The International Constitutional Order’ (2006) 55 ICLQ 51, 51.  
13 Kennedy, ‘The Mystery of Global Governance’, above n.8, 848.  
14 V.S. Mani, ‘Centrifugal and Centripetal Tendencies in the International System: Some Reflections’ in R. MacDonald 
and D. Johnston (eds.) Towards World Constitutionalism: Issues in the Legal Ordering of the World Community (Martinus 
Nijhoff, 2005) 241, 254. See also C. Sylvest, ‘Our passion for legality’ (2008) 34 Review of International Studies 403, 
423. 
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purely as the product of narrow agency granted by state actors.15 Judicial constitutionalisation involves 
both the construction of rules for managing conflict between competing tribunals and the incremental 
development of principles including legal certainty, the rule of law and the global separation of powers. 
Such interactions between tribunals contributes to the emergence of constitutional principles within 
the global legal order even in the absence of a formal effort to create a “global constitution”. 16 
 
(i) The Global and the Domestic  
 
As for the divide between international and domestic governance orders, international law has been 
slow to impinge upon domestic constitutional thinking, especially in dualist countries. A.V. Dicey’s 
influential writings hitched the study of the UK constitution (‘all rules which .... affect the distribution 
or the exercise of the sovereign power in the state’17) to the domestic realm.18 He insisted that the UK 
Parliament’s legislative capacity could not be restricted by international law.19 Long into the twentieth 
century UK-based international lawyers were forced into anxious efforts to establish ‘that international 
law really was a positive system of law’.20 The first efforts towards a constitutional dialogue between 
the domestic and international levels did not emerge within UK scholarship until after the First World 
War, when Frederick Pollock claimed that the League of Nations Covenant confounded ‘the insular 
doctrine lately rather prevalent’ by demonstrating that there ‘really is such a thing as international 
law’.21 H.L.A. Hart’s influential rejection of international law as a legal system further undermined 
these efforts.22 Only with the creation of international bodies, such as the EU, with powers to compel 
                                                 
15 Karen Alter characterizes this development as a ‘judicial revolution’; Alter, The New Terrain of International Law, above 
n.2, 127. 
16 As we are concerned with the place of courts in early-stage constitutionalisation, and not with the nature of an emerging 
global legal order, we do not stake out a position on rival accounts of constitutionalism beyond the state, on which see J.L. 
Cohen, Globalization and Sovereignty: Rethinking Legality, Legitimacy, and Constitutionalism (CUP, 2012) and M. 
Koskenniemi, ‘Constitutionalism as Mindset: Reflections on Kantian Themes about International Law and Globalization’ 
(2007) 8 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 9.  
17 A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (8th Ed., first published 1915, Liberty Fund, 1982) 
22. 
18 See A.W.B. Simpson, Human Rights and the End of Empire: Britain and the Genesis of the European Convention (OUP, 
2001) 35-37. 
19 See S. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (PUP, 1999) 11.  
20 D.H.N. Johnson, ‘The English Tradition in International Law’ (1962) ICLQ 416, 432. See also B. Bowring, ‘What is 
Radical in “Radical International Law”?’ (2011) 22 FYBIL 3, 26-27. 
21 F. Pollock, The League of Nations (Stevens and Sons, 1920) 90. When he later wrote the preface to this work, following 
the rejection of the Covenant by the United States’ Senate, Pollock found himself repeating Thomas Hobbes’ maxim that 
‘[c]ovenants without the sword are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all’; ibid., viii. See also N. Duxberry, 
Frederick Pollock and the English Juristic Tradition (OUP, 2004) 106-07. 
22 See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd edn, OUP, 1994) 213–237. For criticism of Hart’s ‘carelessness’ with regard 
to international law, see J. Waldron, ‘Hart and the Principles of Legality’ in M.H. Kramer, C. Grant, B. Colburn and A. 
Hatzistavrou (eds), The Legacy of H.L.A. Hart (OUP, 2008) 67, 68. 
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action by “sovereign” states, would Diceyan orthodoxy begin to erode.23 Requirements that rules be 
stable and certain likewise provide for much less of a distinction between domestic and international 
legal orders than was the case a century ago.24 Even then, Pollock appreciated that ‘[t]here is no system 
of law, codified or uncodified, in which one may not find many unsettled questions’.25 When few 
contemporary constitutional theorists seek a single sovereign source of authority within governance 
orders,26 instead evaluating whether the ‘organs participating in constitutional politics are brought 
under legal rules’,27 international and domestic governance orders are increasingly susceptible to 
comparative analysis.  
As the global legal order became increasingly juridified and interconnected its complexity 
threatened the coherence attained by nineteenth-century international law, when fewer than 100 states 
dealt directly with each other in an imperialist setting. In other words, the global legal order’s 
superstructure has expanded beyond the capacity of consent-based accounts of its foundations. Even 
so, many states tenaciously cling to external aspects of their sovereignty, generating an obstinacy 
towards global governance structures which becomes problematic as ever more powers are vested in 
a range of non-state actors, including courts and tribunals.28 If this upheaval has in some ways 
challenged ‘the constitutional coherence of national law’, as the International Law Commission (ILC) 
Report on Fragmentation asserts, this effect ‘has been counterbalanced by the contextual 
responsiveness and functionality of the emerging (moderate) pluralism’.29 Notwithstanding efforts at 
mitigation this friction fuels the global constitutionalisation and fragmentation debates.  
In the next sections we examine the UK’s constitutional history and employ it to generate lessons 
for fragmented global constitutionalisation. Although direct comparisons across different levels of 
governance have intermittently excited academic debate, they are often fraught with difficulty.30 
Today’s attempts to up-scale or transplant EU arrangements to global and other regional orders31 draw 
                                                 
23 The UK’s courts have, in the face of these challenges, sought to maintain as much of the orthodox approach as possible; 
see J.W.F. Allison, The English Historical Constitution: Continuity, Change and European Effects (CUP, 2007) 126-127 
and M. Gordon, ‘The Conceptual Foundations of Parliamentary Sovereignty’ [2009] PL 519, 519. 
24 International law’s remit was already expanding when Hart rejected it as a legal system, leading to criticism of Hart’s 
‘carelessness’ in this regard; see Waldron, ‘Hart and the Principles of Legality’, above n.22, 68. 
25 Pollock, The League of Nations, above n.21, 29. 
26 Costas Douzinas notes how even Dicey relied upon multiple notions of sovereignty in his writings on UK constitutional 
law, separating “popular” and “legal” sovereignty; C. Douzinas, Human Rights and Empire: The Political Philosophy of 
Cosmopolitanism (Routledge-Cavendish, 2007) 282-283. 
27 A. Arato, ‘Redeeming the Still Redeemable: Post Sovereign Constitution Making’ (2009) 22 International Journal of 
Politics, Culture, and Society 427, 428. 
28 See A. O’Donoghue, ‘International Constitutionalism and the State’ (2013) 11 IJCL 1021. 
29 ILC, ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International 
Law’ (13 Apr 2006) A/CN.4/L.682, para.493. 
30 For a useful account of the strictures upon comparative constitutional research, even between closely-related domestic 
orders, see M. Taggart, ‘The Tub of Public Law’ in D. Dyzenhaus (ed.), The Unity of Public Law (Hart, 2004) 455, 461-
462. 
31 Kennedy, ‘The Mystery of Global Governance’, above n.8, 830. 
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scorn similar to that heaped on efforts after Versailles to compare the creation of the League of Nations 
to the founding of the United States.32 As Andreas Paulus explains, global and domestic governance 
orders remain distinct because international law has to take into account a range of influences alien to 
domestic orders, including ‘the interstate level of classical international law and the individual level 
of world citizens’.33 UK-global comparisons remain fruitful, however, as both orders arguably seek to 
realise constitutional governance within partially-codified structures. The UK’s ‘constantly 
changing’34 constitutional order is therefore distinct from domestic constitutions which involve ‘a 
selection of legal rules, usually embodied in a single document’.35 Whilst the “murkiness” inherent in 
the UK’s arrangements has provoked claims that the UK is not a ‘true’ constitutionalised order,36 such 
approaches risk prioritising form over substance. Christian Tomuschat supplies a necessary 
countervailing impulse to Paulus when he warns that attaching the epithet “constitution” only to a 
fully-codified body of higher-order law risks neglecting alternative models of constitutionalised 
order.37  
David Kennedy identifies a further risk in domestic-global constitutional comparisons; people 
already ‘come to these debates carrying baggage from their national constitutional traditions’.38 This 
observation may seem particularly apposite when many commentators characterise the UK 
Constitution’s uncodified arrangements as uniquely ‘preservative’ in nature.39 And yet, even in the 
context of a departure as radical as South Africa’s post-apartheid Constitution, its Constitutional Court 
acknowledged that the new order ‘retains from the past’ some “acceptable” elements of the antecedent 
apartheid order.40 No uncodified system of governance, being the culmination of multiple 
constitutionally significant events, with others still to come, can be crudely categorised as forward or 
backward looking.41 Our analysis nonetheless takes the precaution of eschewing direct comparisons 
between substantive constitutional arrangements, instead comparing the processes of 
                                                 
32 G. Butler, ‘Sovereignty and the League of Nations’ (1920) 1 BYBIL 35, 39. 
33 A.L. Paulus, ‘The International Legal System as a Constitution’ in J.L. Dunoff and J.P. Trachtman (eds.), Ruling the 
World: Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance (CUP, 2009) 69, 72. 
34 J.A.G. Griffith, ‘The Brave New World of Sir John Laws’ (2000) 63 MLR 159, 165.  
35 F. Ridley, ‘The Importance of Constitutions’ (1966) 19 Parliamentary Affairs 312, 317. 
36 D. Grimm, ‘The Achievement of Constitutionalism’ in P. Dobner and M. Loughlin (eds.), The Twilight of 
Constitutionalism (OUP, 2010) 11. 
37 See C. Tomuschat, ‘Obligations Arising for States without or Against Their Will’ (1993) 241 Rec.des Cours 195, 217. 
38 Kennedy, ‘The Mystery of Global Governance’, above n.8, 854. On the fetishism which can attend national constitutions, 
see M. Lerner, ‘Constitution and Court as Symbols’ (1937) 46 Yale LJ 1290, 1294. 
39 C. Sunstein, Designing Democracy: What Constitutions Do (OUP, 2002) 67. The notion of an “ancient constitution”, 
adapting incrementally to changes in the needs of the polity, is today most closely associated with the writings of Edmund 
Burke; E. Burke, ‘Conciliation with America’ in P. Langford (ed.), Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke (Clarendon 
Press, 1981) 193. See also J.C.D. Clark, Edmund Burke: Reflections on the Revolution in France: a Critical Edition (CUP, 
2001) 181-3. 
40 Shabballah v Attorney General (1996) SACC 725, [26]. See Arato, ‘Redeeming the Still Redeemable’, above n.27, 441. 
41 See M. Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (OUP, 2003) 4. 
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constitutionalisation.42 Fragmentation is situated as an experience common to the development of both 
orders, with the different stages of their development enhancing the potential rewards for comparative 
analysis.  
The domestic and international spheres are not sealed from each other’s influence, much as 
individual domestic jurisdictions can experience transnational pulls.43 B.S. Chimni has gone so far as 
to suggest that the United Nations (UN) implicitly encourages ‘formal compliance with the norms of 
liberal democracy’, thereby maintaining and fostering the spread of the ‘neo-liberal state’.44 Whilst 
this remains something of an overstatement when formal requirements for UN membership have long 
given way to efforts to secure the Charter’s universal reach, from their inception new states experience 
compliance pull; they ‘must satisfy certain expectations to secure the recognition and acceptance of 
the international community, and these expectations are increasingly constitutional in nature’.45 The 
emergence of non-state actors within international law, the development of informal and formal points 
of governance beyond inter-state arrangements and the proliferation of law and courts at the global 
and regional levels have therefore combined to leave the sovereign state in flux. When the global and 
domestic orders are so intertwined, a working account of global constitutionalisation must attempt to 
reach across these levels of governance. In the following section we therefore take stock of the role 
played by fragmentation in the UK’s long constitutionalisation process. 
 
Fragmented Courts within the UK’s Constitutionalisation Process  
 
The constitutional history, from the mediaeval period onwards, of the UK and its forerunners illustrates 
how the remit of courts functions as a barometer of a governance order’s legalisation and even 
constitutionalisation. Though few contemporary theorists draw upon the UK constitutional order’s 
fragmented past,46 in 1918 it provided a parallel for the historian Albert Pollard in his advocacy of a 
                                                 
42 For an example of the idealisation of substantive aspects of the UK’s uncodified Constitution, see Martin Shapiro’s 
claims that UK arrangements have fostered a unique degree of judicial independence; M. Shapiro, Courts: A Comparative 
Political Analysis (UCP, 1981) viii. 
43 Disputes persist over the benefit of these influences. Some authors see the scope for transnationalism in terms of inter-
elite engagement; A. Slaughter, A New World Order (PUP, 2004) 65-66. Global legal pluralism, by contrast, charts the 
emergence of extensively interconnected orders; A. Fischer-Lescano and G. Teubner, ‘Regime Collisions: The Vain Search 
for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law’ (2004) 25 Michigan JIL 999, 1006. 
44 B.S. Chimni, ‘International Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in the Making’ (2004) 15 EJIL 11, 15.  
45 D.S. Law and M. Versteeg, ‘The Evolution and Ideology of Global Constitutionalism’ (2011) 99 California LR 1163, 
1179. Articles 2.6, 102 and 103, and the UN Charter’s place as customary international law, ensures its relevance beyond 
its state-based membership. 
46 Martin Loughlin notes how, for much of the last 250 years, ‘the British state has managed to present its governing 
arrangements as being so secure as to avoid the need for juristic investigation into its foundations’. M. Loughlin, The 
Foundations of Public Law (OUP, 2010) 3. 
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League of Nations.47 He considered how the twelfth-century monarch Henry II, attempting to restore 
order to his kingdom after protracted turmoil, was hampered by the absence of institutions capable of 
addressing disputes which had hitherto been settled by violence. Undaunted, Henry ‘did not attempt 
to create a new constitution’, but rather introduced legal writs which prevented seizures of land by 
force and permitted claimants to argue their case before a new royal court.48 Pollard argued that with 
the success of these instruments of “royal justice” ‘the habit of argument slowly superseded the custom 
of fighting’.49 Although the English legal system did not begin in an ordered form, based upon ‘definite 
courts with reams of rules and regulations’,50 Pollard insisted that legalisation gradually took hold. 
From these beginnings Pollard portrayed England as rapidly progressing towards a fully 
constitutionalised order.51  
Contemporary international lawyers believed that Pollard’s ‘parallel with the League of Nations 
... is extremely close’,52 for whilst the League was far from a global constitutional order it nonetheless 
featured ground-breaking mechanisms for securing the adjudicated settlement of international 
disputes. Pollard’s Whiggish prolepsis, however, hurries over the intense power struggles between 
actors and institutions which followed, obscuring the significance of fragmentation within the history 
of the English legal system.53 Royal tribunals jostled for authority with feudal, manorial, urban and 
ecclesiastical courts, usurping these rival jurisdictions ‘gradually but relentlessly’54 over the following 
centuries.55 Clashes between the secular and ecclesiastical courts56 descended into particularly 
protracted struggles for supremacy: ‘The secular courts would protect their jurisdiction by writs of 
prohibition, which, however, were difficult to apply and even more difficult to enforce. The 
ecclesiastical courts, if sufficiently provoked, could excommunicate royal judges’.57 Whilst the Royal 
Courts would ultimately gain ‘superintendency’58 over their rivals, this fragmented epoch was vital to 
the governance order’s development; a realisation easily missed if we skip to the current arrangements 
                                                 
47 Pollard was a member of the UK Foreign Office’s Phillimore Committee, which in 1918 drew up an influential blueprint 
for the League of Nations and Permanent Court of International Justice. See D.H. Miller, Drafting of the Covenant (G.P. 
Putnam’s Sons, 1928) 3. 
48 A.F. Pollard, The League of Nations: An Historical Argument (OUP, 1918) 53. For a detailed account of writs de pace 
habenda and writs praecipe, see F.W. Maitland, The Constitutional History of England (CUP, 1919) 112. 
49 ibid., 54. 
50 ibid., 56. 
51 ibid., 56.  
52 Butler, ‘Sovereignty and the League of Nations’, above n.32, 41. 
53 Michel Foucault, drawing on Friedrich Nietzsche, describes processes such as fragmentation as the ‘obscure power 
relations’ from which ideas, in this case constitutional principles, flowed; M. Foucault, Power: Essential Works of Foucault 
1954-1984 (Penguin, 1994) vol.III, 7.  
54 G.B. Flahiff, ‘The Writ of Prohibition to Court Christian in the Thirteenth Century’ (1944) 6 Mediaeval Studies 261, 
261. 
55 See A.R. Hogue, Origins of the Common Law (Liberty Press, 1966) 5. 
56 See Maitland, The Constitutional History of England, above n.48, 10-11. 
57 H. Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (HUP, 1983) 531. 
58 J. Adolphus, The Political State of the British Empire (London, 1818) vol.II, 427. 
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and neglect ‘the legal institutions which didn’t make the grade into today’s structure’.59 Modern 
conceptions of “sovereignty” cannot be grafted onto this extended fragmented era to exclude 
comparison to the global legal order.60 
Soon after the creation of Henry II’s writs even the Royal Courts fragmented into specialised 
jurisdictions.61 The King’s Bench ‘had a general superintendence over criminal justice’, could exercise 
oversight of the actions of crown officeholders and ‘could entertain any civil action in which the 
defendant was charged with a breach of the king’s peace’.62 The Court of Common Pleas dealt with 
‘all cases between subject and subject’.63 The Court of Exchequer, from ‘ambiguous’ beginnings 
relating to royal revenue, came to administer cases relating debt.64 The relationship between these 
courts was not static, with Frederic Maitland explaining how professional interests drove a centuries-
long struggle for predominance: ‘[Much] of our legal history is to be explained by the fact that for 
centuries the judges were paid by fees; more business therefore meant more money, and they had a 
keen interest in attracting cases to their courts’.65 These courts vied amongst themselves and with later 
tribunals including the Court of Chancery (administering equity as opposed to common law) and, more 
infamously, the Star Chamber. Whilst the Court of Common Pleas saw its jurisdiction undercut by its 
rivals,66 Chancery would prove much more adept at resisting attempts by the King’s Bench to establish 
its dominance.67 Equity’s ‘procedural advantages’ were such that common law judges came to fear 
that Chancery would usurp their institutions.68 In 1616, James I had to personally intervene in this 
power struggle, maintaining the Chancery’s ability to prevent the enforcement of a King’s Bench 
judgment obtained by inequitable means.69 This intervention prevented equity from being subsumed 
into the remit of the King’s Bench, maintaining divisions between the common law and equity which 
would persist until the 1870s. Long after the UK governance order’s constitutionalisation the legal 
system of England and Wales remained a tapestry of overlapping and fragmented jurisdictions.  
                                                 
59 T. Barnes, ‘Star Chamber Mythology’ (1961) 5 Am.J.Leg.Hist. 1, 1. 
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Although infighting amongst courts would appear to be endemic as a hierarchical order emerges, 
these centuries of fragmentation would subsequently be all but forgotten. Modern judges ordinarily 
dress up the historic infighting as evidence that ‘[t]he common law courts have always been vigilant 
and jealous of any attempt to usurp or encroach on their jurisdiction’.70 But fragmentation had real 
benefits for the maturing constitutional order. At times of major upheaval the existence of rival 
tribunals as some of the order’s most prominent ‘constituted bodies’71 helped to maintain a degree of 
constitutional continuity. For example, the Crown’s use of the Star Chamber as to expedite its legal 
business became a source of controversy in the early-seventeenth century. Discontent with this tribunal 
hardened opposition to Charles I in the prelude to the Civil Wars of the 1640s.72 So intense was this 
opprobrium that to this day commentators ‘never tire of affixing the appellation “Star Chamber” to 
any procedure or institution which rightly or wrongly appears to deny justice or to vitiate due 
process’.73 Within a still-fragmented system, however, it could be abolished without unbalancing the 
constitutional order.74 Existing tribunals developed their jurisdictions to compensate for its demise, 
and despite pressure for radical reform of the judiciary ‘the Westminster courts were in general little 
disrupted’ by the fighting.75 For the English legal system the Civil Wars did not, therefore, amount to 
a ‘hurricane … [sweeping] away all institutions of the ancien régime’.76  
The fragmented era also contributed to constitutional principles. Perhaps the most famous 
example of fragmentation giving rise to fundamental principle is found in the royal avowal in Magna 
Carta’s Clause 40 that ‘[t]o no one will we sell, to no one will we refuse or delay, right or justice’.77 
This provision is often regarded as the root of today’s right to a fair hearing, with popular accounts 
explaining the development of the UK’s constitutional order as a process by which ‘[l]aws which had 
been made to defend barons … [were] extended as like rights to everyone else’.78 The barons’ 
immediate concern, however, had not been to precipitate a “constitutional moment”, but to protect 
their own interests in a fragmented legal order which had seen royal writs ‘freely sold to litigants’,79 
and more specifically to parties who had been unsuccessful in actions before the barons’ manorial 
courts. Clause 40’s immediate purpose is better understood if read alongside Clause 34; ‘The writ 
called praecipe shall not be issued for the future, so as to deprive a free man of his court’. In these 
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provisions, the barons were attempting to protect the operation of their manorial courts and the 
revenues thereby gained. Maitland notes that this goal was in part achieved, for ‘in cases of land’ this 
development ‘puts a check on the acquisitiveness of the royal court’.80 But in the longer run displacing 
this writ did not prevent the royal tribunals from gaining the upper hand over manorial courts.81 Later 
constitutionally significant decisions often involved clashes over the preliminary issue of which Royal 
Court had jurisdiction to hear the claim. In Bushel’s Case,82 a landmark decision on the role of juries, 
Vaughan CJ complained that ‘this Court is for Common Pleas, between subject and subject, but in a 
criminal case the plea is between the King and his prisoner’.83 His fellow judges were less concerned 
with the jurisdictional issue than with the substance of the claim and ultimately established ‘that no 
judge can fine or imprison a jury for any verdict they may give, no matter how wrong the judge may 
think it to be’.84 Adam Smith recognised the importance of these institutional rivalries for the 
development of due process; ‘each court endeavoured, by superior dispatch and impartiality, to draw 
to itself as many causes as it could’.85 
One potential side-effect of a fragmented order is that some important issues can be left unsettled, 
stuck in a constitutional “no-man’s-land” between competing jurisdictions. As early as the reign of 
Richard II, efforts were made to separate military law, administered by the Court of the Constable and 
the Marshal, from the jurisdictions of the existing Royal Courts.86 Once a separate system for 
maintaining military discipline developed considerable doubt surrounded whether the power persisted 
to subject civilians to military jurisdiction even in time of revolt or invasion. This uncertainty resulted 
from both long periods in which martial law was not required and the development on a case-by-case 
basis of the rule of law as a constitutional principle. The Wolfe Tone case87 arose following the capture 
of a leader of the failed United Irishmen rebellion in 1798. When Tone was sentenced to death by 
court-martial his father sought a writ of habeas corpus for his release before the Irish King’s Bench. 
To enable it to consider the power of a military court to try a civilian whilst the ordinary courts 
remained open, the King’s Bench ordered the military authorities to stay Tone’s execution. Although 
Tone died of self-inflicted wounds before the military could deal with this intervention, a century later 
the episode led Maitland to conclude that if, during a rebellion, ‘one of the rebels captured, there is no 
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court that can try him save the ordinary criminal courts of the country’.88 Only Parliament could 
‘override’ this constitutional principle,89 as it would come to do in response to twentieth-century crises. 
Parliament’s mandate of alternative legal arrangements in emergency situations, however, did not 
always settle these jurisdictional disputes. The struggle between military and civilian courts was 
reignited when, in Egan v Macready,90 a military tribunal sentenced a civilian to death during the Irish 
War of Independence. When O’Connor MR, a civilian judge, accepted a challenge against this ruling 
on the basis that the military authorities could not ‘sweep away the limitations as to punishment’,91 the 
military commander threatened to imprison anyone, including the judge, who interfered with his 
activities.92 The development of legal constraints upon the executive within the UK’s constitutional 
order, and the degree to which the rule of law remains a contested concept, can therefore be traced in 
part to historic fragmentation. 
Tying together the legal order’s fragmented offshoots took hundreds of years. Whereas a 
multiplicity of tribunals had once advanced constitutionalisation, by the nineteenth century Lord 
Brougham considered that these competing jurisdictions no longer served a useful purpose: 
 
The first state of the Courts being that of distinct jurisdiction, then of course this separation of 
provinces was praised; afterwards, all distinction became obsolete, and then the conflict and 
competition were as much commended: and with far greater reason, if the competition were real; 
but it is almost purely speculative.93 
 
For Brougham ‘real’ competition on issues of legal principle had given way to petty squabbles over 
jurisdiction. The disadvantages of fragmentation within the legal system had come to outweigh its 
benefits. Nonetheless, a further half century would elapse before the Judicature Acts integrated the 
fragmented court structures into a unified structure. These reforms exemplify the difficulties associated 
with merger processes. They were not the result of one paradigm-altering reform moment, but of the 
gradual appreciation of the problems resultant from fragmentation. As such, they encountered 
considerable resistance from legal professionals with vested interests in the existing system.94 One risk 
for such structural reforms within a legal order is the possibility of loose ends. Even after the Judicature 
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Acts practical distinctions remained between equity and the common law.95 Some near-moribund 
courts were left out of the merger settlement altogether. After over a century of disuse, the High Court 
of Chivalry (once tasked with dealing with martial law’s application amongst myriad other causes of 
action), had to determine whether its jurisdiction still existed when its services were unexpectedly 
called upon.96 Lord Goddard, noting that the Court ‘fell into disuse was because how its decisions are 
to be enforced is a matter of great doubt and obscurity’, nonetheless accepted that ‘whatever interval 
may have elapsed since its last sitting, there is no way so far as I know of putting an end to it save by 
an Act of Parliament’.97 Extended processes of juridification do not, therefore, exhibit linear 
progression toward an inevitable conclusion. In the absence of an overarching constitutionalisation 
programme, vested interests and the need to accommodate both prominent and neglected institutions 
pose unique challenges. And although these issues might be particularly acute in a centuries-old order, 
a global constitutionalisation process will ultimately have to address them and in the next section we 
turn to the debate on the fragmentation of the global legal order to consider whether echoes of UK 
constitutional history may be found. 
 
The Fragmented Global Legal Order  
 
Fragmentation indicates that a legal order has matured beyond the point at which it is defined by 
consent-based obligations. If the UK’s constitutional order is the product of a gradual and fragmented 
constitutionalisation process, during which multiple courts superintended overlapping areas of the law 
without a clear hierarchy or fixed jurisdictional boundaries, within modern domestic orders 
fragmentation has largely been relegated to constitutional history. Fragmentation is nonetheless 
inevitable when a legal system develops in a non-ordered fashion and can generate a trajectory towards 
normative constitutionalisation. It remains a live issue within the emerging differentiated global legal 
order.98  
In the constitutional ferment of 1918 influential figures campaigned for a League of Nations 
which would with one stroke constitute an international constitutional order. The pamphlets of 
Frederick Pollock stand out for their combination of idealism and pragmatism. Pollock prized the 
impetus a unified and mandatory court system would bring to a nascent global legal order, arguing for 
a League Covenant ‘whose binding force must depend on the renouncement by every party to it, in 
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some measure, of independent sovereign power, and in particular of the right to be judge in one’s own 
cause’.99 Pollock’s grand vision for the rule of law underpinning global governance came unstuck 
when many states100 refused to grant the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) compulsory 
jurisdiction.101 Undeterred, he had staked out a fall-back narrative that whilst the global governance 
order would not imminently be able ‘to issue direct executive commands ... such power will come later 
if it is not granted at first’.102 Although the League did not provide a substantively constitutionalised 
order, these beginnings did, as Albert Pollard predicted, ‘foster international politics’, by which he 
meant encouraging further constitutionalisation.103 
Giving the example of the Postal Union104 and its imposition of particular rates for foreign post, 
Pollock noted that authority over aspects of governance had already shifted, notwithstanding the 
absence of any overarching global constitutional order.105 The possibility of incremental international 
constitutionalisation might have been instinctively appealing to both Pollock and Pollard as scholars 
of UK constitutional history, but others began to identify the operation of tandem fragmenting and 
constitutionalising pressures. Even as the Second World War raged Manley Hudson, a PCIJ judge, 
noted a groundswell of opinion that a ‘general international tribunal may not be adequate for local 
needs’.106 Soon after the war ended efforts began to augment the UN framework with treaties covering, 
inter alia, human rights (European/American Convention on Human Rights/African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights), trade (WTO/NAFTA/ASEAN), the sea (UNCLOS) and foreign 
investment. In parts of the world deeper regional governance orders were instituted (EU/AU/Eurasian 
Economic Union). Many of these orders feature judicalised dispute settlement and interpretation 
mechanisms. Even in the context of bilateral investment treaties, where no overarching “order” is 
immediately evident, the jurisdiction of the World Bank’s International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID) is regularly stipulated.107 Thus global legalisation serviced by a range of 
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institutions, and with it the beginnings of constitutionalisation, came to cover interactions in numerous 
substantive policy areas. Pollock’s ‘coming rule of law’108 may have been delayed, but this does not 
necessarily mean it has been averted. 
Rather than awaiting some “constitutional moment” we must evaluate what this fragmentation 
tells us about the state of constitutionalisation within global governance order and whether 
constitutional concepts can survive and take root without a global constitutional culture capable of 
perpetuating its foundation story to the point when it gains widespread acceptance. As is evident from 
the UK’s history, claims of horizontal equality amongst multifarious courts may in the short-term have 
a deleterious effect on the rule of law and impose significant transaction costs. The disadvantages of 
such unsystematic developments for the global order, however, should not be overplayed; ‘The 
benefits of the alternative, multiple forums, are worth the possible adverse consequences that may 
contribute to less coherence’.109 The UK’s history also illustrates how tribunals enliven a still-maturing 
order, giving substance to core principles like the rule of law in particular fields even when, in others, 
they are in danger of being honoured in the breach. Much like the High Court of Chivalry the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) had to assess the legality of its 
jurisdiction in the Tadić case.110 In determining that the UN Security Council had acted in accordance 
with the UN Charter, the ICTY was really asserting that its creation complied with a global rule of 
law, highlighting the contribution which specialist tribunal scan make to the global order. In recent 
years many specialised tribunals, including the World Trade Organisation’s Dispute Settlement Body 
(WTODSB), the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) and the CJEU have all 
developed the operation of general international environmental law despite their decisions being 
primarily intended to address the priorities of their own legal orders.111 The absence of a hierarchal 
court structure generates space for experimentation by tribunals, even if the consequent legal 
developments are not always neat.  
If some ‘freewheeling’ jurisprudence enhanced the prominence of courts within the UK’s 
constitutionalisation process, judicial caution has lessened the influence of judicial decisions in what 
Ronald Dworkin described as a ‘comparable formative period’ for international law.112 The 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) has not always undertaken the responsibilities which adhere to its 
billing as the World Court. In particular, no court which flaunts its position as ‘the only judicial body 
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vested with universal and general jurisdiction’113 should abjure, as the ICJ long did, from citing the 
judgments of other tribunals.114 Bruno Simma, whilst an ICJ judge, suggested that his fellow judges 
would avoid the risk of clashes with other tribunals even to the detriment of their reasoning: 
 
[I]f there are international institutions that are constantly and painstakingly aware of the 
necessity to preserve the coherence of international law, it is the international courts and 
tribunals. Such caution might sometimes come at the price of dodging issues that would very 
much have deserved to be tackled …115  
 
Whilst this practice was not distinct from that of many other international tribunals,116 and is in 
decline,117 such an important court holding itself aloof for so long dampened fragmentation’s potential 
to foster fundamental principles.  
 The ICJ’s volte face over citing other tribunals can be linked to its concerns over the impact of 
the lex specialis doctrine, which has long operated to maintain doctrinal coherence in international law 
when multiple horizontal areas of law apply to the same dispute.118 Employed both as an interpretative 
tool and a substantive rule, lex specialis enables a more specific legal framework to trump its more 
general counterpart,119 thereby permitting specialist tribunals to remodel general rules within their 
remit.120 When a small number of specialist tribunals existed and direct state consent was necessary 
for them to exercise jurisdiction, lex specialis smoothed over potential conflicts between specialist and 
general courts. The doctrine did not, however, mitigate conflicts which arose between tribunals which 
both claimed specialist authority121 and, as the range of international tribunals expanded, so too did 
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the risk that ‘the same rule of law might be given different interpretations in different cases’.122 ICJ 
President Gilbert Guillaume concluded that reliance upon the doctrine might accelerate fragmentation 
and that ‘[f]or the purpose of maintaining the unity of the law, the various existing courts ... could ... 
be empowered in certain cases … to request advisory opinions from the International Court of 
Justice’.123 In other words he was advocating an enhanced role for the ICJ as an apex court to respond 
to the needs of a no-longer horizontal system in which inter-tribunal relations were becoming 
increasingly important.124 
Eyal Benvenisti and George Downs suggest three difficulties with the multiplicity of courts at 
the global level beyond doctrinal incoherence; first, weaker states are less able to engage in the 
resultant procedural cross-fighting; second, such circumstances enable stronger states to dictate their 
venue of choice while circumscribing the forum’s authority; and third, a fragmentation obscures 
intentionality, thereby enabling more powerful states to evade responsibility for the deficiencies in the 
global legal order that they played a prominent role in establishing.125 Their critique suggests that the 
current proliferation of tribunals and the attendant fragmentation could be but a fleeting moment of 
false grandeur within a global governance order which remains dominated by a few powerful state 
actors. We do not dispute that the short-term impact of fragmentation often appears capricious and that 
the adverse impacts have often been disproportionately experienced by the Global South.126 Judicial 
institutions can rise or fall into virtual desuetude for seemingly trivial reasons, such as institutional 
novelty. The waning importance and use of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) following the 
PCIJ’s creation demonstrated a temporary preference for judicial over arbitrarial decision-making.127 
Perceptions over performance also matter. 128 Disillusionment with the ICJ amongst post-colonial 
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states followed the South West Africa Case,129 which pitted self-determination arguments against the 
remnants of colonialism and the Mandate-territory system. The Court’s rejection of Ethiopia and 
Liberia’s challenge to South Africa’s colonisation of its neighbour on an issue of standing was 
perceived to favour colonial powers, thereby illustrating the impact of intentionality upon a tribunal’s 
operation. This inherent instability in the disorganised global system, however, gives rise to multiple 
decision points at which ruptures in the European origins of international law could occur. The key 
factor at such junctures is whether the international tribunal is sufficiently secure to resist any 
subsequent backlash by developed countries. The WTO’s dispute settlement mechanisms, for example, 
have recently seen a decline in the number of disputes raised before them.130 Whilst this drop may in 
part be a by-product of the difficulties which have plagued WTO negotiations, it could also be mark a 
reaction by developed countries against WTO jurisprudence which they perceive as unfavourable. 
Disputes such as EC – Bananas III, for example, saw the WTO Appellate Body accept that member 
states can issue a claim in relation to either the direct or indirect economic effects of a policy, 131 
substantially broadening the scope for developing countries to mount challenges. The ongoing 
negotiations over the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, with its facility for distinct 
adjudication panels, could therefore amount to efforts to sideline the WTO and its institutions by 
regionalising the multilateral trade system.132 Even if ruptures like this are ultimately sealed, they 
indicate that fragmentation cannot be simplistically characterised as a reactionary force within 
international law.  
 
The Path of Fragmented Global Constitutionalisation Perceived  
 
(i) Four Facets of Fragmented Constitutionalisation  
 
The fragmented historical relationships between judicial institutions within the UK’s legal systems 
allow us to perceive, if through a mirror, and darkly, some of the likely features of fragmented global 
constitutionalisation. First, international courts, within and sometimes beyond the limitations of their 
formal jurisdiction, will strive to preserve their competences. This does not necessarily mean tribunals 
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will be locked in a perpetual state of struggle. A tribunal’s awareness of the complexity of the global 
order can also mitigate tensions with other institutions and contribute to a constitutionalisation process. 
In Hassan133 the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) was obliged to consider the interaction 
between its own human rights jurisdiction and rules of international humanitarian law developed by 
the ICJ. Following a careful review of relevant ICJ decisions,134 the ECtHR drew upon the ICJ’s 
acknowledgment that international human rights law and international humanitarian law may apply 
concurrently135 to develop its jurisprudence on the geographical reach of the ECHR regime; ‘the 
Convention cannot be interpreted in a vacuum and should so far as possible be interpreted in harmony 
with other rules of international law of which it forms part’.136 Many other international tribunals, 
including the WTODSB,137 explicitly subject their specialised jurisdictions to the broader framework 
of international law as a means of bolstering their legitimacy.  
In other circumstances, such as the ICTY’s departure from ICJ jurisprudence138 on the control 
test for state responsibility in Tadić,139 a clash with the ICJ enabled the specialist tribunal to assert its 
independent capacity to develop concepts within international law of particular relevance to its remit. 
The premium which the ICJ has historically placed upon inter-institutional comity did not prevent it 
from subsequently reasserting its original test.140 Seen through the prism of the institutional rivalries 
prevalent during the UK’s constitutional development such struggles and accommodations are 
inevitable occurrences as the unstructured global legal order matures. The variety of actors (states, 
individuals, corporations, NGOs and diasporas) claiming different sets of rights and obligations within 
this fragmented order contributes to the need for international tribunals to rely on claims deriving from 
either hierarchy or specialisation to support their interpretations of international law. The ultimate 
success of one competing test over the other, however, is unlikely to be immediately apparent. The 
rival effective and overall control tests for state responsibility both stand until one of the protagonist 
tribunals backs down or until other tribunals lend decisive support to one test over the other. One of 
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the tests will likely gain acceptance,141 with this outcome determining not only when a state may be 
held responsible for the actions of non-state actor142 but also when a non-state actor can be held liable 
under international criminal law.143  
Such disputes are not mere theatre, in this instance the distinction determines the direction of 
international criminal law and has provoked considerable critical evaluation of the rival tests.144 UK 
constitutional history’s second lesson for the global order is therefore that jurisdictional struggles 
between institutions have the potential to elucidate fundamental constitutional principles underpinning 
the order. In the era before intense fragmentation the ICJ’s eagerness to recognise erga omnes norms, 
and its reticence towards jus cogens norms,145 generated considerable debate over the substantive 
content of these respective norms, which have both been characterised as central to the global 
constitutionalisation process.146 Jus cogens norms have been characterised as ‘the first stepping-stones 
towards an eventual build-up of international constitutionalism’,147 meaning that their prolonged 
marginalisation in ICJ jurisprudence risks undermining constitutionalisation.148 Fragmentation, 
however, is challenging the hitherto horizontal nature of international law. The success of specialist 
human rights tribunals, and their jurisprudence touching upon ‘the overriding importance’ of jus 
cogens,149 has contributed to pushing the ICJ towards referencing, if not yet relying upon, these 
norms.150 Multi-forum litigation, which might appear particularly threatening to international law’s 
coherence, can accelerate this development of fundamental principles. The engagement of multiple 
tribunals in the MOX Plant case,151 for example, increased concerns that jurisdictional uncertainty in 
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environmental law was becoming pervasive, but the institutions involved were ultimately able to 
resolve the jurisdictional dilemmas facing them.152 The litigation not only clarified the relationship 
between the tribunals involved but saw the tentative development of the precautionary principle as a 
key feature of international environmental law.153 Even when multiple decisions produce outcomes 
which seem difficult to reconcile, in the short run potentially affecting stakeholder confidence in 
tribunals and certainty of jurisdiction, such diverging jurisprudence might ultimately enhance 
understanding of the substantive legal issues in question. Of course, the benefits of multiple actions in 
terms of substantive developments in international tribunals’ jurisprudence will not always outweigh 
the costs.  
The third illustrative lesson the UK provides for global fragmentation is that, within fragmented 
orders, levels of use are critical to a jurisdiction’s development. Swathes of public international law 
have not been subject to a specialist jurisdiction and are therefore rarely litigated. These fallow areas 
can in part be attributed to the global legal order’s historical simplicity; until the PCA’s creation in 
1899, inter-state negotiation and good offices held sway (but they also demonstrate, to paraphrase 
Louis Henkin, that the majority of international law functions most of the time154). Novel litigation 
can lead to the development of previously dormant aspects of tribunal’s jurisdiction and may require 
the tribunal to re-align itself and its jurisprudence. The wrangling between Libya and the ICC over the 
trial of Saif Gaddafi indicates how jurisdictional claims can be resolved by the courts themselves, in 
this instance by developing the doctrine of complementarily in international criminal law.155 Courts 
are always rising and falling within fragmented legal orders, as litigants test the range of available 
forums in their search for a desired outcome. Disputes often assume a multi-institutional character 
when a legal issue is novel and the positions of international tribunals are consequently fluid.156 The 
Australian Tobacco Plain Packaging dispute spilled from the Australian High Court into the WTODSB 
and ICSID.157 Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s arrest and criminal trial in Russia has resulted in cases before 
the ECtHR, the PCA and the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce.158 The 
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Chevron and Ecuador dispute regarding responsibility for environmental pollution has now been heard 
before domestic courts in the US and Ecuador, the PCA and the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights.159  
In many instances of multi-forum litigation each claim forms part of an overall dispute, but 
different international tribunals might well be dealing with different aspects of that dispute dependent 
on their remit and standing arrangements. The Chagos islands litigation, for example, concerns the 
UK’s administration of the British Indian Ocean Territory for defence purposes. One case reached the 
ECtHR based upon the expulsion and continued exclusion of the islands inhabitants,160 another reached 
the PCA as a result of Mauritius’ opposition to the UK’s declaration of a Marine Protected Area.161 
Although the UK won the former case and lost the latter, the subject matter of the claims was 
sufficiently distinct to allow the two tribunals sufficient freedom of action to reach their own decisions 
without conflict. The lack of scope for international tribunals to alter their remit, procedure or standing 
requirements to make themselves more attractive to claimants helps to prevent aggressive efforts by 
particular tribunals to attract litigation.162 Powerful institutions can, however, take steps to secure their 
position against rivals. In Commission v Ireland, part of the MOX Plant litigation, the CJEU attempted 
to prevent EU member states from using alternative international tribunals when a dispute touched 
upon EU law by emphasising that the states owed a ‘duty of loyalty to the judicial system created by 
the Community Treaties’.163 For now, the CJEU maintains this position through the unique depth of 
the EU’s legal order. It remains to be seen whether such claims can be sustained in the aftermath of 
Brexit, an event which could encourage some of the remaining EU member states to become more 
assertive of their ability to choose alternate fora for disputes and which could also embolden rival 
tribunals to make rulings at variance with the CJEU if they hear such cases.164 The possible scope for 
renewed conflict between tribunals after Brexit once again illustrates that the development of a global 
legal order does not involve a linear progression from fragmentation to constitutionalisation but the 
intertwining of these concepts. If multi-forum litigation becomes ubiquitous positive steps may 
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ultimately be required to structure tribunal relationships in place of the current ad hoc judicial 
adjustments, but any such agreements will be more likely to be effective if they reflect the 
understandings which courts have already developed regarding their respective purviews. 
Fourth, in the absence of a centralised political process, the relationships between courts will 
develop over time and on a case-by-case basis. Whilst specialised tribunals do not in theory constrain 
the remit of general institutions, ‘interjudicial dialogue’165 has in practice produced more nuanced 
outcomes. In Belilos,166 the ECtHR actively sought to distinguish ICJ jurisprudence on the opposability 
of reservations to human rights treaties. The same issue was at stake in Loizidou167 where Strasbourg, 
having considered the ICJ’s inter-state remit,168 built on Belilos by asserting that ‘a fundamental 
difference in the role and purpose of the respective tribunals ... provides a compelling basis for 
distinguishing Convention practice from that of the International Court’.169 Strasbourg thereby asserted 
its own jurisdiction countered possible ICJ censure. The ILC would ultimately accept that this strand 
of ECtHR jurisprudence constituted a manifestation of the lex specialis principle.170 The need for 
specialist tribunals to justify such divergent practice indicates the degree to which this principle is 
warping under the increasing intensity of fragmentation. Not all Strasbourg interactions with ICJ case 
law, however, attempt to finesse the latter court’s jurisprudence; the subject matter at issue can pull 
the relationship between tribunals in different directions. In Behrami,171 Strasbourg refused to accept 
human-rights challenges where the impugned action, by international forces maintaining order in 
Kosovo, was based upon the UN’s mission ‘to secure international peace and security’.172 This 
approach prevented a conflict between the ECtHR and the ICJ regarding the oversight UN 
operations.173  
The CJEU’s Kadi174 jurisprudence on the necessity of due process in the context of the EU’s 
application of the UN’s counter-terrorism asset-freezing regime provides the most prominent example 
of the adaptation of lex specialis, with the position taken by a specialist regional tribunal feeding back 
into the development of the general part of international law: 
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[T]he Courts of the European Union must … ensure the review … of the lawfulness of all Union 
acts in the light of the fundamental rights forming an integral part of the European Union legal 
order, including review of such measures as are designed to give effect to resolutions adopted 
by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.175  
 
This approach does not ‘claim complete autarky’ from general international law for EU law,176 but 
rather foregrounds the exceptionally important concerns which have necessitated the CJEU’s distinct 
approach for the attention of other judicial institutions. The Kadi decisions not only alter the 
relationship between EU Law and wider international law, the divide they exposed between these legal 
orders deepened autochthonous principles within EU law.177 The CJEU’s stand on due process rights 
provoked wider reform within UN-mandated asset-freezing, including the introduction of independent 
oversight.178 A broader debate on whether the ongoing court-centred constitutionalisation process can 
continue without a political process which enhances democratic legitimacy within global governance 
may be increasingly desirable, but such jurisprudence is capable of incrementally restructuring the 
global legal order into a constitutionalised system.  
 
(ii) The Four Facets in Practice: Opinion 2/13  
 
A case which showcases these four facets of fragmented constitutionalisation is the CJEU’s refusal, in 
Opinion 2/13,179 to accept that the EU can accede to the ECHR on the terms of the Draft Agreement 
on Accession.180 This refusal does not sit easily with Court’s participation in the Agreement’s 
drafting,181 or with the fact that its refusal to countenance accession two decades earlier in Opinion 
2/94182 was based upon a lack of EU competence to do so. Although it might be suggested that Opinion 
2/13 is of regional significance but little wider importance for the global legal order, the CJEU and the 
ECtHR have been standard bearers for judicial constitutionalisation. Of the examples already discussed 
Kadi, Belilos and the Mox Plant cases demonstrate not only the importance of these courts, but also 
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their propensity to be drawn into conflict with each other and other tribunals. Although the Lisbon 
Treaty sought to address this issue by requiring the EU to accede to the ECHR,183 opponents of 
international constitutionalisation have delighted at the CJEU’s efforts to stymie the integration of 
these two legal orders. In the wake of Opinion 2/13 the UK’s then Lord Chancellor (and subsequently 
leading Brexit campaigner) Chris Grayling crowed that the CJEU was right to be concerned that the 
ECtHR has ‘a legal blank cheque to decide different things in different areas in the way that it 
chooses’.184 Opinion 2/13, however, is far from the end of this story of integration, and as we shall 
demonstrate the CJEU and ECtHR are continuing to forge their relationship through case law. As such, 
this particular clash between regional courts provides a concentrated version of the conflicts emergent 
within the global order and evidence of the transformational potential of such conflicts.  
The CJEU’s decision is unsurprising in light of fragmented constitutionalisation; in both Opinion 
2/94 and Opinion 2/13 the CJEU was defending its own competences against the possibility of having 
to submit to the ECtHR’s jurisdiction. In fragmented and constitutionalising orders many judges will 
instinctively seek to preserve the jurisdiction of their own tribunal against perceived threats. This 
motivation is all the more powerful when a rival tribunal is regarded as successful. Both the ECHR 
and EU have been, in terms of regional tribunals, ‘exceptionally active’.185 In little over 50 years of 
jurisprudence they have played a vital role in deepening the legal orders they superintend.186 Both 
institutions have had to develop and manage their relationships with the domestic courts of their 
respective member states. In recent decades both have faced challenges as their success threatened to 
swamp their mechanisms and have undergone restructuring to enable them to address these 
challenges.187 Opinion 2/13 is therefore driven by the express concern that the ECtHR is a tribunal 
which could conceivably establish itself as superior to the CJEU within aspects of its area of 
competence188 and which might in some instances be able ‘to take the place of the Court of Justice’.189 
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This position, at first sight, seems to overstate the threat posed by the ECtHR, which is ordinarily 
considered to have the remit of providing an authoritative interpretation of ECHR rights.190 But 
Strasbourg has also been prepared to clothe its function in constitutional garb in certain decisions, 
going so far as to proclaim the ECHR to be ‘a constitutional instrument of European public order’.191 
The ECtHR has also extended its remit over explicitly EU measures in recent decades, in Matthews192 
holding the UK responsible for breaches of voting rights of residents of Gibraltar denied the vote in 
the European Parliament elections, even though the UK was bound to take this course of action through 
the application of European Community law.193 Such rulings risked raising hackles, for the provisions 
in question were not amenable to CJEU review.194 The ECtHR did attempt to restrict the potential for 
conflict in Bosphorus Airways,195 noting that ‘the [EU’s] judicial organs are better placed to interpret 
and apply [EU] law’.196 In what Tomuschat describes as a ‘grown-up’ decision, Strasbourg recognised 
that as the EU organs had ‘handled human rights issues responsibly, there was no need for an additional 
stage of international review’.197 It has since maintained that ‘it is primarily for the national authorities 
… to interpret and apply domestic law, if necessary in conformity with [EU] law, the Court’s role 
being confined to ascertaining whether the effects of such adjudication are compatible with the 
Convention’.198 Nonetheless, the ECtHR’s capacity to review the application of measures, even when 
they lie outside the CJEU’s competence, remained a concern in Opinion 2/13. The Luxembourg Court 
noted the limits to its jurisdiction to review activity pursuant to EU Common Foreign and Security 
Policy,199 and complained that the same strictures would not apply to the ECtHR.200 
In fragmented orders flashpoint cases shape the relationships between courts. The Accession 
Agreement, however, marked an effort to impose a relationship, as opposed to codifying a dynamic 
established by existing jurisprudence. As such, it was always likely to provoke a backlash in trying to 
yoke together two legal orders in advance of their respective flagship tribunals building a relationship 
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on their own terms. The most pressing problem with the CJEU’s ruling is not its all-too-predictable 
defensiveness, but the lengths to which this runs. Backed into a corner, the CJEU risks sealing off 
interaction with other regional and international systems out of concern for the “uniqueness” of the 
EU legal order:201  
 
The autonomy enjoyed by EU law in relation to the laws of the Member States and in relation to 
international law requires that the interpretation of those fundamental rights be ensured within 
the framework of the structure and objectives of the EU.202 
 
The irony in this approach is that the CJEU is in many ways behaving just as EU member state apex 
courts have long done in attempting to secure their position in the face of its claims of primacy.203 To 
this day the CJEU’s relationship with national courts remains uneasy, with Lords Neuberger and 
Mance asserting in the UK Supreme Court, with a certain prescience given the outcome of the UK’s 
Brexit referendum, that it is ‘certainly arguable (and it is for United Kingdom law and courts to 
determine) that there may be fundamental principles … of which Parliament when it enacted the 
European Communities Act 1972 did not either contemplate or authorise the abrogation’.204 
Speculative fears that the national courts might exploit the post-accession relationship between the 
CJEU and ECtHR pervade Opinion 2/13. The CJEU’s concerns that Protocol 16 ECHR, by which apex 
courts in ECHR states can refer questions to Strasbourg for advisory rulings, might be used to usurp 
EU law’s preliminary reference procedure205 are explained at length, even though Protocol 16 is yet to 
enter force, had not at the time been ratified by a single EU member state,206 and was a process not 
covered by the Accession Agreement.207 
Former ECtHR judge David Thór Björgvinsson has described Opinion 2/13 as ‘a political 
decision disguised in legal arguments’.208 ECtHR President Spielmann was also quick to convey 
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Strasbourg’s ‘disappointment’, questioning Opinion 2/13’s rationale in light of the European project’s 
telos and its neglect for the intent of the state parties to the Lisbon Treaty:  
 
In deciding that the Union would accede to the European Convention on Human Rights, the 
drafters of the Lisbon Treaty clearly sought to complete the European legal area of human rights 
... The opinion of the Court of Justice does not render that plan obsolete; it does not deprive it of 
its pertinence.209  
 
In a fragmented order, however, the pertinence of a rationalisation scheme is not necessarily sufficient 
to secure its adoption, because constitutional objectives such as a homogenous interpretation of human 
rights can be achieved in large part without such interventions. To date, ‘the story of human rights in 
the EU is largely the story of interaction between the Luxembourg and Strasbourg courts’.210 Forcing 
accession upon a reluctant CJEU would hardly have settled the issue; Luxembourg would continue to 
resist subordination to Strasbourg.  
Opinion 2/13 is not the final word on the EU/ECHR relationship but a milestone in competition 
between two courts. The ECtHR retains the ability to put indirect pressure on the CJEU, perhaps by 
restricting the Bosphorus doctrine.211 Far from insulating the EU legal order from the reach of the 
ECtHR, Opinion 2/13 merely moves the focus of a challenge from the EU measure itself to 
implementation activity undertaken by the 28 EU member states, all parties to the ECHR. Potential 
flashpoints include EU member state implementation of the European Arrest Warrant or EU 
immigration rules, areas in which the CJEU has to date placed a premium upon ‘mutual trust’212 
between states to avoid being drawn into assessing varying standards of rights protection.213 By 
entertaining challenges in these areas, and likely drawing upon the TEU’s statement of the symbiotic 
relationship between the two orders, the ECtHR could bring the struggle to a crisis point, potentially 
obliging member states to intervene and impose a settlement. Such a standoff is, however, far from 
inevitable. The CJEU has in many cases been careful to respect the ECtHR’s purview, asserting that 
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EU law ‘does not govern the relations between the ECHR and the legal systems of the Member 
States’.214 In a manner which is more low-key than the aggrandising sentiments of Opinion 2/13 efforts 
are under way to map the CJEU’s approach to ECtHR jurisprudence.215 In Bero216 Advocate General 
Bot recognised that EU law on the expulsion of third-country nationals had been adopted to align with 
ECHR requirements217 and took account of the relevant ECtHR jurisprudence in his opinion.218 If 
Advocate Generals’ opinions have become an outlet for explaining the links between EU law and the 
ECHR, this avenue for rapprochement has been restricted by the CJEU’s refusal to engage with ECtHR 
decisions in its subsequent decisions.219 Nonetheless, the scope for ‘spontaneous, mutual 
accommodation’ clearly exists.220  
The Opinion 2/13 conflict might well be localised to two well-developed regional systems, but 
it could be the harbinger of increasingly intense skirmishes across the global legal order if parts of the 
order continue to deepen and constitutionalise. Domestic, regional, global and specialised bodies with 
distinct but often overlapping jurisdictions and stakeholders cannot indefinitely continue to function 
on the basis of fuzzy notions of comity. Fragmentation duplicates arrangements and can incidentally 
promote the mystification of processes and institutions, but it also generates the tensions necessary to 
overcome these problems. Intense institutional rivalries, comparable to those presently gripping the 
European legal orders, were eventually played out during the UK Constitution’s development. Judge-
driven constitutional activity, including the CJEU’s role in developing EU Law,221 the DSB’s impact 
upon WTO processes,222 and the ICJ’s posturing as an apex court,223 locates courts as vital nodes 
within global constitutionalisation with the capacity to address gaps left by political processes. Such 
action often occurs in fragmented manner and does not need to be initiated by a particular constitutional 
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settlement. Courts fighting to maintain their jurisdictions can, if supplied with sufficient litigation, 
elucidate constitutional principles and even systematise inter-tribunal relations. Opinion 2/13 will not 
be the last setback in this process, but the burden of advancing constitutionalisation does not fall solely 
upon international courts. President Spielmann identified the role of other institutions in helping the 
Europe’s courts beyond their present impasse; ‘The Union’s accession to the Convention is above all 
a political project and it will be for the European Union and its member States ... to provide the 
response that is called for by the Court of Justice’s opinion’.224 Whilst a trajectory towards a 
hierarchical global legal order is by no means inevitable, the UK’s constitutional history demonstrates 
the potential for fragmentation within international law to be turned into constitutional outcomes 
within a maturing governance order. 
 
Constitutional Alchemy 
 
Since the nineteenth century international law’s time has always seemed tantalisingly close; ‘The 
increasingly popular mantra of evolution was invoked, often in a mixture of social and legal 
evolutionary ideas, to explain not merely the relative powerlessness of international law but also its 
forthcoming deliverance’.225 With the debate as to whether international relations can be subject to law 
largely settled by the fact of increased legalisation, does it move the goalposts to switch from asking 
whether global governance can be legalised to whether it can be constitutionalised? It does not, if 
fragmented legalisation is bound up in a constitutionalisation process and ‘the increasing density of 
international law is … indicative of the growing importance of international legal regimes’.226 The 
global legal order’s current, fragmented, state evidences a legalised and differentiated governance 
order primed for constitutionalisation.  
From a state of fragmentation and the beginnings of legalisation, the UK’s governance order 
gradually constitutionalised. Fragmentation remains at work in the UK’s legal systems; in England 
and Wales activity as common as anti-social behaviour can potentially be addressed through criminal 
law responses, under quasi-criminal anti-social behaviour mechanisms or via a tort action in nuisance. 
The interaction between the courts administering such cases may have become systematised and 
hierarchical, but in the sweep of constitutional history these are relatively recent developments. Harold 
Berman once asserted that, in all legal systems, ‘great events themselves have exerted pressures for 
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change in certain directions over a long period’.227 In the UK’s uncodified order not only great events, 
but even relatively unimportant ones, are often invested with constitutional significance; ‘[e]verything 
that happens is constitutional’.228 We enjoy sufficient historical perspective to chart how pressures for 
change within the UK’s governance order gradually advanced constitutionalisation even though the 
legal order remained ‘both polycentric and stable for centuries’.229 In the absence of such perspective 
regarding the global order, attempts to assess its supposed ‘constitutional moments’230 are, of 
necessity, contingent. Nonetheless, we maintain that the global legal order could also constitutionalise 
without a codified global constitution. Small and seemingly insignificant moments can ultimately forge 
a constitutional structure.  
If the global legal order is to fully constitutionalise, fragmentation must ultimately be either 
addressed or accommodated. Doing so will likely generate problems of a similar nature (but on an 
increased scale) to those experienced during the UK’s constitutionalisation process. The UK’s 
nineteenth-century Judicature Acts were necessary because its judicial architecture by that point lagged 
behind its other constitutional arrangements. The inertia which had slowed these reforms was 
generated by vested interests’ concerns over who would be the winners and losers.231 That the UK’s 
fragmented judicial institutions could ultimately be reorganised to better serve the needs of a capitalist 
and proto-liberal-democratic society indicates that fragmentation is not an insurmountable obstacle to 
constitutionalisation. Comparable inertia currently hampers the integration of distinct legal orders at 
the global and regional levels, as exemplified in Opinion 2/13. The Draft Agreement on Accession in 
some respects mirrors the Judicature Acts, with the aim behind both measures being to restructure the 
relationship between courts to counter fragmentation. But such planned restructuring of the 
relationship between regional legal orders is not the only means of mitigating fragmentation when it 
becomes burdensome. In an uncodified global legal order inter-institutional accommodations might 
well have the same effect as formal reorganisations. Such accommodations, moreover, might have to 
become embedded before any codification of the relationship between courts is accepted. 
We leave for another occasion the second-order question of whether, assuming that further 
constitutionalisation of the current system of global governance is possible, it is ultimately desirable. 
Kennedy remains concerned by such developments; ‘[w]hat if the distances are so great, the forces so 
chaotic, the differences in situation so profound that the constitution ratifies what ought rather to be 
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transformed?’232 Talk of ratification betrays a conception of “constitutionalisation” which we do not 
share. A constitutional order founded on the interrelationship between fundamental principles and 
interaction between institutions, and not reliant upon a codified instrument, may well embody the 
responsiveness necessary to meet changing global circumstances. For now it suffices to note that any 
uncodified constitutionalised global order would not replace domestic governance structures, but 
augment their role so as to better secure the idealised goals of peace and human rights. No 
constitutional order is static or immutable but uncodified arrangements can moderate some of the 
biases against reform experienced by codified systems. UK constitutional history offers an instructive 
prism through which to examine fragmentation’s contributions to constitutionalisation. 
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